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Abstract. The prominence of aviation security has increased 
dramatically in recent years. As a reaction to the new threat situation 
large investments into modern security technology have been made. 
State-of-the-art X-ray screening equipment provides high resolution 
images, many image enhancement features and even automatic 
explosive detection. However, the most expensive equipment is of 
limited value if the humans who operate it are not selected and 
trained to perform their task accurately and efficiently. In fact, 
according to several experts, the human operator is currently the 
weakest link in aviation security. This article presents results of 
studies conducted over the last four years which clearly show that 
threat detection in X-ray images can be increased substantially by 
investing into human factors technologies that are based on results of 
visual cognition, object recognition and psychophysics. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing object shapes in X-ray images is still a very difficult problem for 
computers. Any serious computer vision scientist will tell you that there still is a long 
way to go in order to build an artificial visual recognition system that can detect 
objects as quickly and reliably as humans do (for recent advances in biologically 
motivated computer vision see for example Bülthoff, Lee, Poggio, & Wallraven, 
2002). About two thirds of the human brain is used for processing visual information. 
Here we are talking about billions of neurons operating in parallel. This is more than 
just another dimension of parallel processing than state-of-the-art multi-processor 
computer systems can provide. The architecture of the human cognitive system builds 
on millions of years of evolution and it is highly adaptive to the requirements of the 
environment. Indeed, each individual has enormous perceptual learning capabilities, 
which can be recruited when using the appropriate training. In addition, there are large 
differences between people with regard to their visual processing abilities. 
This article shows how the efficiency of X-ray screening in airport security can be 
increased substantially by investing into human factors technologies that are based on 
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results of visual cognition, object recognition and psychophysics. Section 2 presents 
new findings about image-based factors and screener ability that are relevant for pre-
employment assessment. Section 3 shows how individually adaptive computer-based 
training (CBT) can be used to increase screener competency efficiently and 
effectively. Finally, section 4 presents new ideas for third generation threat image 
projection systems, in which quality control, risk assessment and adaptive training are 
combined with each other. 
2 IMAGE-BASED FACTORS AND SCREENER ABILITY 
Several image-based effects influence how well threat items can be recognized in X-
ray images (Schwaninger, 2003b; Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2004). As 
illustrated in Fig. 1a., viewpoint 
can strongly affect recognition 
performance. Systematic effects 
of viewpoint have been reported 
in many object recognition 
studies (for reviews see Tarr & 
Bülthoff, 1995, 1998; Graf, 
Schwaninger, Wallraven & 
Bülthoff, 2002; Schwaninger, in 
press). In general, objects are 
difficult to recognize when 
depicted from an unusual 
viewpoint and when diagnostic 
features are not visible. Object 
recognition has also been shown 
to be dependent on exposure. 
When an object is not similar to 
a stored view, it often becomes 
difficult to recognize. Another 
image-based factor is related to 
the fact that in X-ray images objects are often superimposed by other objects. As 
depicted in Fig. 1b this effect of superposition can impair detection performance 
substantially. A third factor is bag complexity, which is determined by the number 
and type of other objects in the bag (Fig. 1c). Since other objects distract attention, 
bag complexity can also affect detection performance. 
In order to measure how well people can cope with these image-based factors, the X-
ray Object Recognition Test (ORT) has been developed (Schwaninger, 2003b, 2004a). 
This test uses only guns and knives, object shapes that are known well by novices. 
The test contains 256 X-ray images, half of them with a threat item and half of them 
with harmless bags. The guns and knives are depicted in easy and difficult viewpoint, 
with little and much superposition in bags of low and high complexity. All X-ray 
images of the ORT are in black-and-white, as color is mainly diagnostic for the 
material of objects in the bag and thus could be primarily helpful for experts. The 
ORT is fully computer-based. Each image is only displayed for 4 seconds, simulating 
conditions of high passenger flow during which average inspection times often are in 
the range of 3-5 seconds. For each X-ray image, participants have to decide whether 
the bag contains a gun or a knife or whether it is harmless. 
Fig. 1 Image-based factors: a) effect of viewpoint (canonical vs. 
non-canonical), b) superposition by other objects (low vs. high), c) 
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Fig. 2 shows means and standard deviations from a study conducted with 284 
candidates that applied for an X-ray screening job. Detection performance is indicated 
by A’, which can be calculated from hit and false alarm rates (for details see 
Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 2004; Hofer & Schwaninger, 2004). There were 
systematic effects of view, superposition, and bag complexity. When the threat items 
were depicted in rotated view, recognition performance dropped substantially. When 
the guns and knives were superimposed by other objects, detection performance was 
also reduced significantly. Finally, showing threat items in complex bags, made them 
more difficult to recognize as well. 
Really remarkable is the fact that there are very large differences between individuals 
with regard to how well they can cope with these image-based effects. The thin error 
bars in Fig. 2 depict standard deviations and the stars indicate the performance of the 
2.5% best and 2.5% worst performing candidates. Similar main effects and large inter-
individual differences have been consistently found for different participant groups 
involving novices and aviation security screeners at different European airports. 
Screeners usually perform better, but we always found significant main effects of 
view, superposition and bag complexity. Most importantly, even for screeners, large 
differences can be found between people with regard to how well they can cope with 
effects of view, superposition and bag complexity. The results of a recent study 
conducted with 134 novices and 134 aviation security screeners suggest that these 
image-based effects are related to visual abilities. Interestingly, only moderate 
increases as a result of practice can be observed (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & Hofer, 
2004). In other words, people differ substantially with regard to screener ability and 
this seems to remain relatively stable even after years of working as a screener. A test 
like the ORT could therefore provide a very interesting tool for enhancing pre-
employment assessment of airport security screeners. Indeed, a recent analysis 
revealed that the results of the ORT are strongly correlated with detection 
performance measured with CTI threat image projection (correlations of r > .5). This 
further implies that a substantial increase in detection performance can be achieved if 
tests like the ORT are used as part of a pre-employment assessment system (which is 
the case at Zurich airport since this year). However, it should also be noted that X-ray 
screening is certainly a demanding and complex task. Therefore, several other abilities 
Fig. 2 Effects of viewpoint, superposition, and bag complexity found in a study conducted with 284
novices that applied for an airport security screening job. Thin error bars represent standard deviations. 













































need to be taken into account for a fully integrated personnel assessment system. For 
further information on this topic see the papers on hiring and personnel selection in 
this volume. 
3 COMPUTER-BASED TRAINING AND SCREENER COMPETENCY 
The previous section has shown that image-based factors such as view, superposition 
and bag complexity affect how well threat items can be detected. Even more 
important is the knowledge about which items are prohibited and what they look like 
in X-ray images of passenger bags. Consider the three X-ray images depicted in Fig. 
3. The bag on the left contains two threat items that are difficult to recognize for 
novices because most people are not exposed to them in reality. The bag in the middle 
contains a threat item that is quite difficult to identify without training because the X-
ray image looks very different than the real object. In contrast, the other threat item in 
Fig. 3b is difficult to recognize because it looks similar to a pen, a well known 
everyday object. These examples illustrate the need for an X-ray image library 
containing a large number of different kinds of prohibited items, based on a selection 
by aviation security experts, vision scientists and intelligence information. The bag on 
the right illustrates another problem that was already mentioned in the previous 
section. When objects are depicted in an unusual viewpoint, they can become very 
difficult to recognize1. Indeed, a large number of studies in psychophysics and 
neuroscience have provided converging evidence indicating that the human brain 
stores objects as a collection of associated views (e.g. Logothetis, Pauls, Bülthoff, & 
Poggio, 1994; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995; 1998; 
Wallraven, Schwaninger, & Bülthoff, 2002). When objects are depicted in an unusual 
view, they become difficult to recognize if view-invariant diagnostic features are not 
available. Since this is often the case in X-ray images, a large image library in which 
objects are depicted in different views is necessary in order to achieve reliable threat 
detection despite changes in viewpoint. 
                                                 
1 Note that in several European countries a screener instead of the passenger places the bag on the belt 
of the X-ray machines in order to reduce the possibility that a terrorist takes advantage of the effects of 
viewpoint on recognition performance. 
Fig. 3 Threat detection in X-ray images is strongly dependent on training and expertise. a) two threat 
items that are not well known from everyday experience (self-defense gas spray and torch light with 
shooting mechanism), b) threat item that looks very different in the X-ray image (taser) vs. threat item 
that looks like an innocent object (switchblade knife looking like a pen), c) two threat items that are 
difficult to recognize without training because they are depicted in unusual views (gun and scissors). 
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3.1 MULTIPLE VIEWS TIP LIBRARY 
Based on a close collaboration between vision scientists and aviation security experts 
we have built a multiple views library that currently contains 36’000 X-ray images of 
fictional threat items (FTIs). Object recognition research indicates that for most 
objects six views are sufficient to capture the qualitative differences resulting from 
viewpoint changes2. These six views constitute the basic view set (Fig. 4a). The 
easiest view is referred 
to as the canonical view. 
It can be determined 
objectively by analyzing 
detection performance 
data from CBT or TIP. 
Alternatively, subjective 
rating methods can also 
provide a good estimate 
of viewpoint difficulty, 
at least on an ordinal 
scale. The remaining 
views of the basic view 
set can be created by 
rotating the object 
around the vertical axis and the horizontal axis. The method depicted in Fig. 4a uses 
45° and 85° rotations around either the horizontal or the vertical axis and 45° rotations 
around both the horizontal and the vertical axis. Several own studies as well as studies 
conducted in other labs have shown that the human recognition system can interpolate 
between stored views (e.g. Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1998; 
Wallraven, Schwaninger, Schumacher, & Bülthoff, 2002). This will enable screeners 
to recognize views that are between the training views of the basic view set. Using 
computer algorithms mirror-reversed versions can be created as depicted in Fig. 4b. 
Since rotations in the plane can also have an effect on recognition performance (for a 
recent review see Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, & Bülthoff, 2002) it is advisable to 
create plane rotated versions (Fig. 4c). The current version of our view-based library 
contains 500 prohibited items and each of them can be displayed in 6 basic views x 4 
mirror reversals x 3 plane rotations = 72 views. This results in a total of 500 
prohibited items x 72 views = 36’000 X-ray images. Of course it is not necessary to 
show each screener all these images. But an individually adaptive training system 
should determine for each screener which views are difficult and adapt the training so 
that the trainee becomes able to detect threat items reliably even if they are 
substantially rotated away from the easiest view. 
The need for a sophisticated CBT system with a large image library and training 
algorithms based on results of visual cognition, object recognition and detection 
theories from psychophysics was realized when we conducted the first studies on X-
ray detection performance in 2000 and 2001. We found that certain threat items are 
well recognized by screeners, whereas other types of threats seemed to require more 
training in order to achieve reliable recognition. 
                                                 
2 This accounts for non-rotational solids, i.e. objects that are not symmetrical around one of the three 
main axes. For rotational solids, i.e. objects that are symmetrical around a main axis, three basic views 




















a Six Basic Views
(fully standardized)
b All views flipped
horizontal and vertical
=24 views
c Each view in
3 planar rotations =72 Views / Object
Fig. 4 Basic principles of the multiple views X-ray image library. 
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Essentially, object recognition means to match visual information from stimuli (e.g. 
an X-ray image) to visual representations stored in visual memory. The content of 
visual memory is dependent on exposure. Shapes are difficult to recognize if they are 
not similar to objects that have been encountered earlier and were stored in visual 
memory. This was illustrated in Fig. 3 at the beginning of section 3. The six threat 
items in that figure are very difficult to recognize due to different reasons. First, many 
threat objects are not known from everyday experience. Examples are the self-defense 
gas spray and the torch light with shooting mechanism that are contained in the X-ray 
image depicted in Fig. 3a and Fig. 5a. Second, certain threat items look quite different 
than the real object. An example is the taser weapon shown in Fig. 3b and Fig. 5b. 
Moreover, certain other threat items look very similar to harmless objects. For 
example the switchblade knife in Fig. 3b could be easily mistaken with a pen (see also 
Fig. 5c). A third very important but often neglected problem are effects of rotation. As 
mentioned earlier, when objects are depicted in unusual viewpoints, they can become 
very difficult to recognize. This was illustrated for a gun and scissors in Fig. 3c. The 
upper row in Fig. 5d and Fig. 5e depicts these two threat items in canonical view, i.e. 
the view that is easiest to recognize. As you can see in the bottom row, effects of 
viewpoint can indeed be detrimental to recognition performance. 
After analysing the results of the first studies conducted at Zurich Airport in 2000 and 
2001 we were looking for a CBT system that has a large image library containing 
thousands of images depicting threat items in different viewpoints. Moreover, such a 
system should be efficient and effective by applying individually adaptive training 
algorithms that calculate for each screener which items and views need to be trained 
particularly. The results of our first survey were that all existing CBT systems had 
only small image libraries and they did not feature individually adaptive training 
algorithms. Instead, the commercially available systems focussed on providing many 

















Fig. 5 Illustration of different knowledge-based factors using different types of threat items. a) 
Forbidden object that is usually not known from everyday experience (self-defense gas spray), b) 
prohibited item that looks very different in the X-ray image (taser), c) threat object that looks like a 
harmless object (switchblade knife looking like a pen), d) and e) effects of viewpoint illustrated with a 
gun and scissors. 
 
It actually sometimes seemed that the quality of a CBT would be dependent on 
providing an exact replica of the X-ray machine with as many image processing and 
 
a b c d e
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enhancement features as possible. However, the goal of the training system we had in 
mind was to train screeners to detect threat items reliably within the first 3-5 seconds 
of inspection time before image processing features might be applied. In order to 
achieve this, a scientifically based training system was needed that features a large 
image library, sophisticated adaptive training algorithms and feedback mechanisms 
that are based on results of perceptual learning. Since nothing like that existed, we 
decided to create such a system on our own. In a close collaboration between 
psychologists, vision and computer scientists as well as aviation security experts the 
first version of X-Ray Tutor was built in 2002 and installed at Zurich airport. This 
training system was a great success already at the beginning. It is now commercially 
available3 since 2003 and Version 1.7 is currently used by some of the largest security 
organizations in the world. The United States Transportation Security Administration 
is using X-Ray Tutor at airports across the country since spring 2004 as part of its 
recurrent training and professional development program for airport security 
screeners. The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority has started using X-Ray 
Tutor at several airports as part of a research project with the University of Zurich on 
X-ray image tutoring technology for aviation security screeners. X-Ray Tutor is 
operational in Switzerland since 2002, at 17 airports in Germany since 2003, and 
since 2004 in Belgium and other European countries. 
In the following section the main characteristics of X-Ray Tutor are presented and it 
is illustrated how this system can be used for research purposes such as measuring 
training effectiveness and investigating image-based vs. knowledge-based factors of 
threat detection performance. 
3.2 INDIVIDUALLY ADAPTIVE TRAINING 
At the heart of X-Ray Tutor are results from scientific studies on how the human brain 
processes visual information in order to recognize objects from different viewpoints 
(Schwaninger, 2003c, 2004b; for recent overviews on object recognition see Graf, 
Schwaninger, Wallraven 
& Bülthoff, 2002; 
Schwaninger, in press). 
The main characteristics 
of the system are 
depicted in Fig. 6. The 
system uses a 
sophisticated algorithm 
to create training 
sessions for each 
individual student based 
on detection 
performance, response 
time and X-ray image 
difficulty ratings. The individually adaptive algorithm of X-Ray Tutor starts with easy 
X-ray images. Then, view difficulty is increased and trainees learn to detect threat 
items in different viewpoints. X-Ray Tutor uses the view-based image library 
described above, which allows presenting each threat item in 72 different viewpoints. 
                                                 
3 X-Ray Tutor is available from the following institutions and companies: University of Zurich / APSS, 












Fig. 6 Schematic diagram of the training system (see text for further 
information). 
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As mentioned before, it is not necessary to show each item in all viewpoints. The 
adaptive algorithm of X-Ray Tutor shows for each trainee preferentially those views, 
which need to be trained especially. Once a threat item can be recognized despite 
changes of viewpoint, it is shown in more complex bags with more superposition. The 
individually adaptive algorithm uses objective measures of view difficulty, 
superposition and bag complexity. These measures have been shown to be correlated 
with human detection performance and they are based on several years of research 
involving vision scientists, image processing specialists, statisticians, and aviation 
security experts. As students progress the algorithm monitors students’ performance 
and custom designs each subsequent training session to target areas in need of 
improvement. 
Students learn more when given the opportunity to receive immediate feedback about 
their performance. X-Ray Tutor provides detailed feedback during a training session 
about the student’s performance. Students can review any X-ray image to learn where 
the threat item is located and what it looks like both in X-ray and standard 
photographic view (see Fig. 7). At the end of each training session, students are given 
feedback on their performance, so they can visually see their improvement over time. 
Since X-Ray Tutor has been developed by scientists, you can imagine that this 
sophisticated tool can also be used for several research purposes. Using the data of 
training trials is complicated by the fact, that the training system adapts to each 
individual and displays more difficult images the better a screener becomes in 
detecting threats. In order to achieve a more reliable measurement of detection 
performance across time, a certain number of “test images” can be shown within 
training sessions. These images are the same for all screeners providing a more 
Fig. 7 Screenshot of X-Ray Tutor CBS. Immediate feedback is provided after each trial and trainees 
can display a threat information window showing the threat item as X-ray image and as photograph. 
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reliable basis for standardized detection performance measures. The test images can 
be shown periodically at criterion-based or time-based intervals so that an evaluation 
of training effectiveness across time becomes possible. When X-Ray Tutor is used in 
a research project, the data from testing trials is stored in reports than can be imported 
easily into applications for further analysis such as standard office software or 
analysis tools for large databases. Using the reporting feature, detection performance 
can be analyzed and visualized across time, for individual screeners, groups of 
screeners, specific FTIs and groups of FTIs. This data can then be used in order to 
answer several important questions such as for example: 
- How does detection performance increase over time? 
- Which threat items are difficult to recognize? 
- How does viewpoint affect threat detection performance? 
- How reliable are individual performance measurements? 
 
These questions are currently being investigated in research projects conducted in our 
lab. The following section summarizes the results of a study that was conducted in 
2002/2003 in order to measure training effectiveness and investigate perceptual 
learning mechanisms. A detailed description of this study can be found in 
Schwaninger and Hofer (2004). 
3.3 MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS AND INVESTIGATING PERCEPTUAL 
LEARNING 
The study was conducted in the period of December 2002 – May 2003 with 72 
participants. None of them had received computer-based training before. Each week, 
1-2 training sessions of 20 minutes were completed during the six months period. X-
Ray Tutor HBS for training detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was 
used. The research questions were as follows: 
- Does IED detection performance increase over time as a result of individually 
adaptive training? 
- Are there large differences in detection performance when images are displayed 4 
vs. 8 seconds? 
- Does training result in a decrease of response time? If so, is that decrease different 
for threat images vs. harmless bag images? 
 
Four tests were conducted in which new IEDs were used that had not been shown 
previously during training. Display durations at test were 4 and 8 seconds (during 
training, images were displayed for a maximum of 12 seconds). The four tests were of 
equal difficulty as determined in a pilot study. Signal detection theory was used to 
analyze the data (Green & Swets, 1966). Detection performance was measured using 
d’ = z(H) – z(FA), whereas H represents the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z the 
z-transformation. Similar results were obtained using non-parametric A’ instead of d’ 
as performance measure (for a comprehensive introduction on signal detection and X-
ray screening see Schwaninger (2003a); for more detailed information on different 
detection measures of X-ray detection performance see Hofer and Schwaninger 
(2004). The results of the four tests are displayed in Fig 8. There was only a small 
effect of display duration, i.e. detection performance was similar for display durations 
of 4 and 8 seconds. This is consistent with the view that recognition is a fast process 
occurring within the first few seconds of image inspection. More important is the 
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knowledge about threat items, which is dependent on training. Indeed, large increases 
of detection performance were observed across the four months of training (Fig. 8a). 
In order to assess training effectiveness we calculated % increase as compared to 
baseline measurement (first test results). As you can see in Fig. 8b relative detection 
performance was increased by about 71%. This is a remarkable effect if it is taken 
into account that on average screeners took only 28 training sessions during the six 
months period (SD = 10 training sessions). Moreover, for a subgroup of 52 screeners, 
who on average took 31 training sessions (SD = 8 training sessions), the training 
effect was even more pronounced. For this group relative detection performance was 
increased by 84.46%! 
Fig. 8 a Absolute detection performance measured by d’, b detection performance increase expressed in 
percent relative to the first measurement. 
 
The analysis of response times revealed interesting findings with regard to efficiency. 
As can be seen in Fig. 9, training with X-Ray Tutor resulted in a much faster detection 
of threat items. Correct response times for threat images dropped from about 5 
seconds before training to about 3.5 after six months of training. There was also an 
effect of display duration, although much smaller in effect size than the overall 
training effect. For harmless bags average response times remained constant at about 
5 seconds. This finding is consistent with the assumption that individually adaptive 
CBT increases the number and strength of representations in visual memory. Because 
the participants have learnt what IEDs look like they became able to detect them 
reliably within a few seconds of inspection time. However, the acquired knowledge 
does not help if there is no threat item in the bag. Since no substantial reduction in 
response time was observed for harmless bag images, the learning effect seems rather 
Fig. 9 Response time data as a function of training. a) Response times for correct decisions on threat 























































































related to visual memory representations than to increased general visual processing 
capacities. 
In summary, these results show that individually adaptive training can be a very 
powerful tool in order to achieve reliable detection of threat items within a few 
seconds of inspection time. Moreover, this study also provides a nice example for the 
value of X-Ray Tutor as a research tool. For example for measuring detection 
performance and training effectiveness, as well as gaining a better understanding of 
perceptual learning mechanisms in order to increase efficiency in X-ray screening. 
4 THIRD GENERATION THREAT IMAGE PROJECTION 
Threat image projection (TIP) is a technology that allows projecting virtual threat 
images on X-ray screening systems. If a screener does not detect a TIP image within a 
specified amount of time, a feedback message appears indicating that a projected 
threat was missed. Feedback messages are also shown when a TIP image is detected 
or in the case of a non-TIP alarm, i.e. when the screener indicated that there was threat 
but no TIP image has been projected. In hold baggage TIP, combined threat items are 
projected that contain X-ray images of whole bags with threat items. In hand baggage 
screening, fictional threat items (FTIs) are projected into X-ray images of passenger 
bags during the screening operation. 
 
TIP is now used in several countries and the following advantages have been 
associated with it: 
- Increased alertness of screeners 
- Increased motivation and work satisfaction of screeners 
- Screeners can be exposed to threat items that are normally not found in real bags 
- Analysing TIP data can be used to measure aggregated detection performance 
 
Usually the TIP:Bag ratio is set to a value between 1:50 and 1:200, i.e. a TIP image is 
shown to a screener every 50 - 200 bags on average. Because screeners are only 
exposed to a few threat items when using TIP, this technology is not very powerful 
for training purposes. Current TIP systems use random presentations of TIP images. 
As a consequence, the TIP images can sometimes be too easy and some other times 
too difficult for certain screeners. In order to achieve better effects of alerting and 
individual screener motivation, TIP needs to be individually adaptive. Moreover, 
especially when TIP is introduced, image libraries have to be used that contain 
relatively easy threat items. Since images are presented randomly, the projection of 
difficult TIP images could result in operational problems when introducing TIP. 
However, if an adaptive TIP system would be available, this problem could be solved. 
Just as described for adaptive CBT in section 3.2, an adaptive TIP system would start 
with easy images and increase the difficulty depending on individual detection 
performance increase. Using such an approach, each screener can be alerted, 
motivated and trained more optimally by showing threat items that are neither too 
easy nor too difficult to detect. A problem resulting from random projections of FTIs 
into passenger bags is the fact that image difficulty depends largely on general item 
difficulty, view difficulty, superposition and bag complexity (see section 2). This 
makes it very difficult to know whether a screener missed a TIP image due to 
insufficient visual knowledge or because it was shown in a difficult view, 
superimposed by other objects and in a complex bag. In order to solve this problem, 
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missed TIP images need to be analysed for image difficulty resulting from effects of 
general item difficulty, viewpoint, superposition and bag complexity. Such an analysis 
is essential in order to determine the training needs for each screener individually. The 
results could then be used to optimize individually adaptive training using CBT. 
In collaboration between scientists, aviation security experts and Smiths Heimann we 
have created a new TIP system that solves all above mentioned problems. The name 
of the system is 3i-TIP, representing the following three main characteristics: 
individual adaptation, image processing and integration of training and quality 
control. Fig. 10 shows the system architecture as it is implemented at Zurich airport. 
Instead of using random projections the 3i-TIP system starts with easy TIP images 
and increases threat image difficulty based on individual performance increase. Each 
screener is alerted, motivated and trained more optimally by showing threat items that 
are neither too easy nor too difficult to detect. All missed TIP images are analyzed by 
the 3i-TIP server using image processing algorithms in order to determine image 
difficulty resulting from effects of viewpoint, superposition and bag complexity. The 
results are then analysed using sophisticated statistical models to calculate the 
detection performance of a screener more accurately and estimate which threat objects 
he or she needs to be trained on. The results of this analysis are used to adapt 
individual training sessions on X-Ray Tutor workstations, which are connected to the 
3i-TIP server. Based on the achievements in training the threat item difficulty in TIP 
is increased, which closes the loop between real world performance in TIP and X-Ray 
Tutor as a very effective and efficient training tool. 
 
Fig. 10 Main components of the 3i-TIP system installed at Zurich airport. 
 
The third i in 3i-TIP stands for integration of training and quality control. In addition 
to the adaptive mode, the 3i-TIP system will also feature a testing mode. If the testing 
mode is activated, a certain percentage of TIP images (e.g. 30-50%) are used for 
performance measurement purposes. Each screener receives the same FTIs in a 
random order during a certain period of time. This provides a more reliable basis for 
measuring detection performance than the purely random projection of current TIP 
systems. Because standard TIP does not control the random selection of FTIs for each 
screener, it usually happens that some screeners are exposed to certain FTIs many 
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be avoided by using the testing mode of 3i-TIP. It makes sure that each screener 
receives the same FTIs equally often in a certain period of time. This provides much 
more reliable data for screener performance measurement, quality control and risk 
assessment purposes. 
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